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Macroeconomic  Adjustment
and Growth
Can external restraint and internal balance in  What would be the macroeconomic effects
Mexico be reconciled at savings and investment  of debt-equity swaps?  Swapping public debt for
levels that allow satisfactory output growth?  private cquity, says van Wijnbergen, would raise
What role do fiscal policy, interest rates, oil  the,  equilibrium inflation rate substantially if
prices, and exchange rates play?  How would a  Lley were implemented on a scale large enough
cutoff from external capital markets affect  to be interesting from a macroeconomic point of
output growth?  This paper develops and uses an  view.  But without access to foreign capital
econometric model for Mexico to discuss these  markets in one form or another, output growth
questions.  would be compromis_d.
A period of rapid growth and heavy external  The increase in external debt implied by
borrowing cnded for Mexico with the debt crisis  renewed access to international capital markets
of mid-1982.  This episode taught certain  does not really threaten Mexico's  credit-
lessons, according to van Wijnbergen:  Growth  worthiness.  Lending to Mexico would probably
acro  Rit-  b,  uinsustainable-  tor.rnvng  ..  increase the cxpcctLL rct  repaIyILrit,  in iLeitls  of
produce later losses that more than offset earlier  discounted value, rather than decrease it-
gains.  Mexico's  agenda should therefore be  increased upfront borrowing notwilltstanding.
renewed growth within the limits of credit-
worthiness.  Fiscal constraint is equally neces-  But much depends on developments in
sary, to kcep inflation low and predictable.  world commodity and capital markets.  A 2
percent increase in world interest rates would
As long as internal interest rates remain as  slow down Mexico's growth an estimated I
high as they are, Mexico's  fiscal problems are  percent.
intractable without renewed access to foreign
capital markets.  But rollover of half or two-  Therefore, extemal debt arrangements
thirds of foreign interest payments, in addition to  should include contingency clauses conditional
principal payments, would bring a solution  on developments in oil prices and interest ratec.
within reach.  However, service of the face value
of the current debt - without substantial  Van Wijnbergen concludes that with foreign
amounts of new money - is incompatible with  financing in place, and Mexico's  internal reform
renewed output growth and thus not really in  program continued and deepened, a cautiously
anyone's  interests.  optimistic prognosis seems justified. Growth is
likely to begin recovering by the end of 1989,
Renewed access to foreign capital markets is  with positive per capita growth thereafter.
imperative both for restoring medium-term  Although this will require additional funding
growth and for success of the current short-term  from abroad, Mexico's debt indicators should
stabilization effort.  But not all forms of access  decline substantially.  If Mexico continues its
are equally beneficial.  reform program, investing in Mexico should pay
off handsomely.
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Mexico's  growth  rate  averaged  6.6%  between  1950  and 1974.  Between  1982
and 1987,  Mexico  did  not grow  at all.  This stark  contrast  sets  the  agenda  for
the  next six  years.  Restoration  of growth  to rates  that  offer  some  hope of
improvement  in  per capita  income  should  be the  predominant  economic  concern  in
the  coming  Sexenio.
Of course,  Mexico  has recently  done even  better  than  6.6%.  Between  1978
and 1982  the  economy  grew  at no less than  8.7%  per year  on average.  However,
over the  same  period  external  debt tripled,  from  29 to  86 billion  US dollar.
Thus the  ratio  of external  debt to  GDP  jumped  from 28 to 52  percent,  the  high
growth  rate  notwithstanding.  This  period  was  brought  to a  crashing  halt  during
the  debt  crisis  of mid-1982.  The 78-82  episode  highlights  the  constraints
under  which  ths  economy  should  operate  even if they  would  not  be externally
imposed;  growth  accompanied  by unsustainable  debt  accumulation  could  very  well
lead  to later  losses  that  more than  offset  the  earlier  gains.  The agenda  is
therefore  not  just restoration  of economic  growth,  but  renewed  growth  within
the  limits  set  by creditworthiness.
Recent  economic  history  has taught  another  lesson.  The outburst  of
spending  in the late  seventies,  and the  subsequent  decline  in  oil  prices  and
increases  in real interest  rates  payable  on the  external  debt caused  serious
public  finance  problems.  These  public  finance  problems  in turn triggered  an
increase  in inflation  not seen  earlier  in  Mexico's  economic  history.
International  evidence  clearly  demonstrates  that  high inflation  rates  go
together  with  high relative  price  variability  even  when underlying  supply  and
demand  factors  show  no such  variability.  To this,  high inflation  will add
fears  of future  recessionary  stabilization  programs.  It should  thus  be clear
that  high inflation  effectively  precludes  efficient  private  sector  investment
at levels  necessary  for  satisfactory  output  growth.  Economic  stability  is
therefore  a precondition  for  efficient  economic  growth.  The agenda  is thus
further  restricted:  to the  external  constraint  are  added  the  fiscal
constraints  dictated  by the  requirement  of low  and  predictable  inflation
rates.
To sum  up:  can external  restraint  and internal  balance  be reconciled  at
le",els  of savings  and investment  that  allow  satisfactory  output  growth?  What
is  the role  of fiscal  policy,  interest  rates  and  exchange  rates  in  bringing
such  a configuration  about?  Should  an attempt  be made to  borrow  more?  What
does  this imply  for  the future  burden  of the  debt?  To which  extent  do the
answers  to  all these  questions  depend  on external  events  such  as oil  price  or
interest  rate shocks?  In what follows  we first  (Section  III)  provide  an
analysis  of the  consistency  of fiscal  deficits  with  other  macroeconomic
targets.  Issues  of growth,  external  balance  and  real  exchange  rates  are taken
up in Section  IV.
The remainder  of the  paper  is  organized  as follows.  In  Section  II,  we
set the  stage  by providing  a  brief  historical  overview  of the  developments
leading  up to the  current  situation.  We th-n  present.  a quantitative  framework
that  allows  us to  go beyond  qualitative  discussions  in exploring  the  policy
options  ahead.  Section  IIT,  assesses  the  limits  on fiscal  policy  imposed  by the
macroeconomic  targets  embedded  in the  stabilization  program.  In Section  IV  we
discuss  whether  within  these  constraints  satisfactory  output  growth  can  be
acl'ieved  without  jeopardizing  external  balance.  We discuss  the  role  of2
exchange  rates  and fiscal  policy,  and  trace  the  impact  of external
developments  on growth  and  external  debt in  Mexico.  Section  V concludes.
II. Stabilitv,  Expansion  and  Collapse:  a Brief  Review  of the  Past
Between  1950  and 1974,  Mexico  enjoyed  a remarkable  period  of  high
growth,  low  inflation  and  moderate  external  debt  accumulation.  Real growth
averaged  6.4%,  and inflation  was in single  digits  throughout  the  period.  This
era  of fiscal  conservatism  came  to an abrupt  end in the  early  seventies.
Rapidly  expanding  government  involvement  in the  economy  pushed  up the  rate  of
economic  growth.  However,  increasing  government  expenditure  was not  matched  by
rising  public  sector  revenues.  At the  same  time  a decline  in private  savings
incentives  (real  interest  rates  turned  sharply  downwards)  prevented  a  matching
increase  in private  savings.  As a result,  inflation  tax  and  external  debt
became  increasingly  important  sources  of finance.  The  period  of single  digit
inflation  ended  in 1973,  the  real  exchange  rate  started  to appreciate  and
external  debt  accelerated  beyond  the  rate  of growth  in  GDP from that  year
onwards.
Sharp  adjustment  measures  in 1976  were  not followed  by a major  crisis
because  major  oil  discoveries  and  subsequent  oil  price  increases  provided
relief  of  both fiscal  and  external  problems.  In fact the  subsequent  period  was
characterized  by both rapidly  expanding  government  revenue  and  vastly
increased  public  sector  borrowing.  On one  measure  (share  in  Value  Added),  the
government  sector  increased  by almost  one third  over this  period.  Government
investment  increased  its  share  in total  investment  from 33.5%  over  the  period
1970-75  to substantially  over  40% in later  years.  Not surprisingly,  the  real
exchange  rate  once  again  started  to  appreciate,  eroding  the  gains  of the  1976
devaluation.  This expansion  was largely  fueled  from  abroad:  Mexico's  external
debt increased  from 16  bUS dollar  to 86  bUS dollar  between  1975  and  1982.  A
rapidly  appreciating  real  exchange  rate  masks this  increase  when measured  as a
share  of GDP  however.
All this  came  to an end in 1982  when rising  world interest  rates  and
falling  oil  prices  put  an end to the increasingly  expansionary  policies  of the
Lopez-Portillo  administration.  The subsequent  cut  off  from  external  capital
markets  left  no option  but fiscal  retrenchment.  .Mexico,  which  had run  non-
interest  current  account  deficits  in each  of the  preceding  thirty  years,
suddenly  needed  to run  surpluses  on that  account  in  every  following  year.  The
ratio  of external  debt to GDP  shot  up anyhow  under  the  influence  of rising
interest  rates  and falling  growth  rates.  The gap  between  real interest  rates
on external  debt  and real  GDP  growth  went from -6.3  percent  in 1980-1981  to a
full  +10.5  percent  in 1983.  Differences  chis  high mean  that,  even  without
deficits  on the  non-interest  current  account,  the  burden  of debt  will increase
rapidly,  simplv  through  the  compounding  effect  of interest  on debt inherited
from  the  past.  In addition  came  substantial  capital  losses  on external  debt
due to the  necessary  real  exchange  rate  depreciation.  The real  depreciation
was  unavoidable  given  the  major  decline  in  oil revenues  and rise in real
interest  obligations,  but it  added  no less than  30  percentage  points  to the
ratio  of external  debt to GDF  during  the  period  1982-1987.
The counterpart  to the  non-interest  current  account  improvement  was  a
fiscal  adjustment  effort  that  is probably  unmatched  on a sustained  basis in
any  country.  A primary  fiscal  deficit  of 7.1  percent  of GDP  before  the  crisis
was turned  into  an astounding  surplus  of 5.3  percent  in 1987  and  an estimated3
7.6% in 1988.  And this  while  revenues  from  oil  exports  declined  by more than  7
percent  percent  of GDP  between  1983  and  1988,  and  GDP growth  declined
dramatically.  Non-interest  government  expenditure  was reduced  from the
equivalent  of 34%  of GDP in 1982  to about  25% in 1987.  The public  enterprise
divestiture  program  was successf'ul  in closing  oz selling  roughly  600  smaller
entities,  out  of a total  of about  1200  at the  beginning  of the  period,  with
negotiations  initiated  or scheduled  to start  on a few  larger  enterprises.  In
addition  to all this,  Mexico  has  undertaken  structural  reforms  at an
accelerating  pace  over this  period.
1983  saw  an IMF  supported  stabilization  effort,  during  which the  fiscal
deficit  was halved,  international  reserves  recovered,  and inflation  came  down.
However  in 1984  and 1985  there  was some  fiscal  expansion  and  monetary
relaxation.  On top  of that  came the  earthquake  late 1985  and a major  terms  of
trade  deterioration  in 1986  due  to falling  oil  prices. In response,  the
authorities  adopted  a new stabilization  program  in  July 1986.  In return  for
renewed  monetary  and fiscal  austerity,  this  program  also  called  for  a
concerted  financing  effort  on the  part  of Mexico's  creditors.
The 1986  package  included  new  elements  of policy  reforms  designed  to
eliminate  structural  rigidities  in the  economy.  The most  significant  change  is
a  major  reortentation  towards  exploiting  the  benefits  of international  trade.
Exports  of manufactures,  spurred  by a 42%  real  depreciation  over the  July
1985-December  1987  period,  have  overtaken  oil  exports  and  more than
compensated  for  the  7 billion  U.S. dollars  oil  revenue  loss  experienced  over
the  same time  span.  The  trade  liberalization  process  gained  momentum  since
1985.  QRs were  more than  halved,  tariffs  reduced  sharply,  and  quantitative
controls  on non-oil  exports  almost  eliminated.
The fiscal  retrenchment  was  clearly  unavoidable  given  the  sudden  lack  of
access  to international  capital  markets  and  the  series  of adverse  terms  of
trade  shocks  that  took  place  over the  period.  As a  byproduct,  the  severe
fiscal  cutbacks  have greatly  increased  the  efficiency  of many  of the  remaining
government  operations.  But  cutting  the  public  sector  investment  budget  from
almost  10%  of GDP in 1982  down  to an estimated  3.0%  of  GDP in 1989  clearly  has
its  costs;  government  investment  has  a role to  play in areas  that  heavily
complement  private  investment  and in the  social  sectors. Also,  private
investment  has  not  made  up for  the  decrease.  In fact  it is surprising  that  the
volatile  macroeconomic  situation  has  not  led to  a larger  decline  in  private
investment.  It now is  more  or less  at its  pre-oil-boom  level  of 11 to 12
percent  of GDP.
With lower  investment  on the  one  hand,  and  rertrictive  demand  management
on the  other,  real  growth  again  stopped.  There  has  been  no real  growth  between
1982  and 1988,  and  hence  a severe  decline  in  per  capita  income.  Also,
inflation,  rather  than  slowing  down,  in fact  accelerated  towards  the  end  of
the  period,  partially  in response  to a sharp  nominal  devaluation.  This
devaluation  had  become  necessary  because  of the  abrupt  oil  price  decline  in
1986.  The  subsequent  de-facto  targeting  of the  real  exchange  rate,  together
with an increase  in the  frequency  of wage  and  cost  adjustments,  introduced  at,
element  of inherent  instability  into  the  system.  This  latter  became  fully
apparent  towards  the  end  of 1987.  The stock  market  plunge  and  a temporary
opportunity  for  private  debt  buy  backs  evolving  from  the  1987  debt
rescheduling  triggered  a run  on the  peso.  This resulted  in reserve  losses  and
eventually  a 37%  depreciation,  fueling  inflation  and  expectations  of further
exchange  rate  depreciations.  Mexico  responded  with the  Pacto  de Solidaridad,  a4
concerted  effort  to bring  down inflation  that  was now running  well into  triple
digits.
The Pacto (and  its  successor,  the  PECE)  have to date clearly  been
successful.  Inflation,  after  accelerating  well into triple  digit  levels  in
1987,  has been around  one  percent  a month  most of the  second  half of 1988.  A
brief increase  in December  and  January  seems  over  as the  March  rate is  once
again  in the  one  percent  range.  Nevertheless  sustainability  fears  seem  not  yet
allayed:  domestic  interest  rates  are  still  over 50%  once compounded,  and in
real terms  slightly  over 30%  if the inflation  target  of 20%  is going  to  be
met.  Much of that  is clearly  related  to worries  about  the  public  finance  and
exchange  rate impact  of the  external  debt situation.
III.  Consistency  of Fiscal  Policy.
A fiscal  stance  that  does not  conflict  with sustained  low inflation,
even in the  event  of unfavorable  external  developments  and  continued  high real
interest  rates,  is clearly  necessary,  although  possibly  not sufficient,  to
allay inflationary  fears.  Only if the  inflation  compatible  with public  finance
requirements  is compatible  with the inflation  rate implied  by the fixed
exchange  rate regime,  is che  latter  going  to  be sustainable.  And this  in turn
id the  cornerstone  of the Pacto.  Thus  medium  term  consistency  requirements,
when  violated,  give  a signal  that  will  greatly  complicate  short  term
macromanagement.  This  will require  restrictions  on  both the  overall  deficit
and its  mode of financing.
There  are three  sources  of financing  public  sector  expenditure  beyond
what can  be obtained  from the  regular  tax  system:  external  borrowing,
monetization and issue  of domestic  interest-bearing  debt.  The amount  that
can  be expected  from  each source  will depend  on other  macroeconomic  targets,
such  as inflation,  output  growth,  interest  rates  and  so on.  The revenue  from
these  three  sources  of financing  can  be combined  into  the  calculation  of a
"financeable  deficit".  This is defined  as the  deficit  that  does not  require
more financing  than  is compatible  with sustainable  external  borrowing,
existing  targets  for  inflation  and output  growth,  and  a sustainable  internal
debt  policy..  If the  actual  deficit  equals  this  "financeable"  deficit,  fiscal
policy  is  consistent  with the  macroeconomic  assumptions  and targets  underlying
the  calculation  of the  financeable  deficit.  1/
Underlying  the  framework  suggested  here to calculate  the financeable
deficit  is a model  describing  private  portfolio  choice  as a function  of
inflation,  output  and interest  rates.  This  gives  the  amount  of currency,
demaid  deposits  and time  deposits  the  private  sector  is  willing  to  hold given
output,  inflation  and the  level  and  structure  of interest  rates.  This is
coupled  with a simple  financial  sector  model  incorporating  reserve
requirements  and  other  bank regulatory  policies  to  derive  the  demand  for
reserves  by commercial  banks.  The  demand  for  reserves  is then  added  to the
1  This should  be interpreted  with care.  Consistency  with macroeconomic
targets  does not  guarantee  that  those  macroeconomic  targets  can  or will  be
achieved;  only that the  fiscal  deficit  is  not inconsistent  with them.  To
actually  achieve  the  stated  macroeconomic  targets  may  require  other  measures,
possibly  including  fiscal  retrenchment  beyond  what is required  for  consistency
as defined  here.5
demand  for  currency  already  derived  to get  an estimate  of the  total  demand  for
base money  given  inflation,  interest  rates,  and  so on.  All this is  used to
derive  tocal  revenue  from  monetization,  net of interest  payments  on reserves,
for  different  output  growth  rates,  interest  and inflation  rates  and regulatory
policies.  To revenue  from  mornetization  must  be added  the  revenue  the
government  can  expect  from  eyternal  and internal  debt issue  given  its  external
borrowing  policies  and debt  anagemene  approach.  One can  then  calculate  the
financeable  deficit  2/,
The  difterence  between  the  actual  deficit  in 1988  and  this financeable
deficit  is called  the  required  deficit  reduction,  RDR,  A deficit  cut equal  to
RDR  will restore  consistency  with other  macroeconomic  targets.  The results  of
such  an exercise  for  Mexico  are  summarized  in  Ta'ole  1.  The table  lists  the
results  for  various  assumptions  on other  macroeconomic  variables.
In the  calculations  underlying  the  Table,  it is  assumed  that issue  of
interest-bearing  domestic  debt  is kept  down to a rate that  will maintain  the
real  value  of the  domestic  debt  constant. The reason  for  not allowing  a
faster  rate of domestic  debt  issue  is the  high interest  rate it  currently
carries;  at around  30%  per  year (almost  40%  by year end!),  it is  well above
the  real  growth  rate  of the  economy.  At this  rate,  debt-service  will escalate
as a percentage  of GDP if  more extensive  use is  made of debt-issue  to finance
the  deficit.  As to foreign  financing,  different  options  are  explored.  The
first  row  of the  table  assumes  that  the  nominal  value  of the  foreign  debt
stays  constant  (CAD-O).  The second  row  looks  at the  consequences  of changing
that  option  to either  a constant  real  value  of the  debt  or to assuming  a
constant  debt-output  ratio.
With zero  net foreign  debt increase,  the 1988  operational  deficit  (4.4
percent  of GDP) is seriously  out  of line  with inflation  targets,  as the  first
row  demonstrates.  The  actual  deficit  in 1988  needs  to  be cut  by 4,4 percent  of
GDP for compatibility with an inflation target of 15 percent, o: the er.tire
operational deficit needs to disappear. This reflects the fact that Mexico
receives very little from the inflation tax and seigniorage, because of low
growth and the practice of paying interest on reserves. Even for a 50%
inflation target, the RDR still amounts to a hefty 3.3 percent of GDP.
2  A simple version of this framework was first used in Anand and van
Wijnbergen  (1989).  The current version incorporates external debt
considerations and implications of the financial structure for inflation tax
revenues (van Wijnbergen and Anand (1988)).6
TABLE  1: REQUIRED  DEFICIT  REDUCTION  (RDR)  FOR  CONSISTENCY  WITH  VARIOUS
MACROECONOMIC  TARGETS  (AS PERCENT  OF GDP).
1. NO REAL  EXCH.DEPRECIATION;  CAD=0;  OUTPUT  GROWTH  1.5%
--------------------------------------------------------------
INFLATION  TARGETS  p:  0  5  15  50
RDR:  5.1  4.8  4.4  3.3
2. NO REAL  EXCH.  DEPRECIATION;  INFLATION  15%;  OUTPUT  GROWTH  1.5%
--------------------------------------------------------------
FOR.BORROWING  CAD:  0  3.1  1/  4.0  2/
RDR:  4.4  1.3  0.4
3. NO REAL  EXCH.  DEPRECIATION;  INFLATION  15%;  CONST.B*/Y  RATIO
------------------------------------------------------------ __
OUTPUT  GROWTH  TARGETS  n:  0  1.5  4  5
RDR:  1.5  0.4  -1.3  -1.9
3. INFLATION  15%;  OUTPUT  GROWTH  1.5%;  CONS'r'.  B*/Y  RATIO
_______--------------------------------------------------------
REAL  EXCH.RATE  C:  0  5  10
DEPRECIATION  PV)R:  0.4  3.0  5.7
Notes:  1/ Constant  real  debt  case
2/ Constant  debt/GDP  case
c  :Rate  of depreciation  of the  Real  Exchange  Rate
CAD  :Current  Account  Deficit
n  :Growth  rate  of real  GDP
p  :In.lation  Rates
RDR  :Required  cut in fiscal  deficit  compared  with 1988
(operational)  deficit
B*,B  :Foreign,  Domestic  Debt
y  :GDP
Of course  more liberal  access  to foreign  financing  changes  all that.  The
second  row  shows  that  the  current  deficit  in fact  is compatible  wit!,  an
inflation  target  of 15 percent  if enough  foreign  financing  is  available  to at
least  maintain  the  debt/output  ratio  constant.  A less  liberal  target  would
keep the  real  value  of the  debt  constant,  which implies  a 3 percent  current
account  deficit,  or refinancing  of about  half of interest  payments,  with
correspondingly  higher  need to cut  back  on the  fiscal  deficit.
The third  row  of the  Table  shows  how,  under  a constant  debt-output  ratio
target  for foreign  borrowing,  fiscal  leeway  increases  w.th output  growth.  TheRDR falls  from 1.5  percent  of  GDP at a zero growth  rate to  minus 1.3  RDR at a
four  percent  real growth  rate  for  GDP.
Fiscal  Implications  of Debt  Management
With real interest  rate  differentials  as large  as they  are  now, debt
management  takes  on a great  fiscal  importance.  Take for  example  a debt/equity-
swap  scheme  where say  lObUS$  is  retired  but a corresponding  amount  of domestic
debt is issued  by the  public  sector  to acquire  the  private  equity  used in the
swap,  With a staggering  25 percentage  points  real interest  rate  differential,
this  operation  would  INCREASE  the  real  interest  rate  burden  by no less  than
1.5  percent  of GDP,  raising  the  required  defi.-t  reduction  for  a given
inflation  target  correspondingly.  The impact  on the  operational  deficit  would
be smaller,  but still  1.2  percent.  The smaller  effect  is  because  the
operational  deficit,  somewhat  inconsistently,  counts  payment  of nominal
interest  rate  charges  on foreign  debt,  rather  than  just real  foreign  interest
payments,  like  it does in the  case  of domestic  debt.  Ihe  whole  operation  would
have a major  impact  on equilibrium  inflation:  even  as small  a debt/equity  swap
as the  $10  bUS considered  here  would,  at current  interest  rate  differentials,
raise  equilibrium  inflation  by no less  than  50 percentage  points  (See  van
Wijnbergen  et al. (1988)  for  the  methods  used to arrive  at this  claim).  The
numbers  are so large  because  in  Mexico  the  base for  the inflation  tax is  very
low;  commercial  bank reserves  basically  carry  market  rates,  so the inflation
tax  base is  just currency  in  hands  of the  public,  an almost  negligible  amount.
This points  at the  general  issue  of domestic  debt.  At 1.5%  real  growth
and  no net increase  in foreign  nominal  debt,  the  fiscal  gap is 3.1  percent  of
GDP for  15 percent  inflation.  What if this  gap is filled  by issuing  internal
debt rather  than  foreign  debt?  Since  interest  rates  on internal  debt exceed
the  real  growth  rate  by such  a  margin,  this funding  policy  would solve  today's
fiscal  problem  at the  cost  of a substantially  more serious  one in the
following  year.  This strategy  would  raise  the  required  deficit  reduction  for  a
15%  inflation  rate  from  4.4  percent  to 5.3  percent  of GDP  within  one  year.  If
continued  for six  years,  the  debt-output  ratio  would  have risen  from  19
percent  to 52  percent  of GDP!  This  clearly  highlights  the  fact  that internal
debt issue  should  be avoided  at almost  any  cost in the  current  situation  in
Mexico.
The final  exercise  demonstrates  the  extent  to which  high real interest
rates  are at the  root of  Mexico's  current  fiscal  problems.  Table  2 shows  the
equilibrium  inflation  rate,  i.e.  the  inflation  rate for  which  no fiscal
adjustment  is  required,  for  various  real interest  rates  on Mexico's  internal
debt.  All this  on the  assumrtion  that  no net increase  in the  nominal  value  of
the foreign  debt is  allowed  (i.e  a zero  external  current  account  deficit  for
the  public  sector).8
Table  2: EQUILIBRIUM  INFLATION  AND  THE  REAL  INTEREST  RATE  ON
INTERNAL  DEBT
NO REAL  EXCH.DEPRECIATION;  CAD-0;  OUTPUT  GROWTH  1.5%
REAL  INT.RATE  ON  DOM.DEBT  R  30  15  10
EQUILIBRIUM  INFLATION  p 150  22  0
At the  current  interest  rate,  the  required  deficit  reduction  is 4.4
percent  of GDP; alternatively,  an inflation  rate  of 150  percent  is  needed  to
cover  this  amount  through  inflation  tax.  At a more reasonable  15 real  interest
rate,  the  equilibrium  inflation  rate,  for  which  no fiscal  adjustmert  is
required,  falls  to 22 percent!  At a real interest  rate  of ten  perce-  the
equilibrium  inflation  rate  falls  to zero.  Note that  as inflation  x  ,
additional  revenue  from inflation  tax  falls,  necessitating  increasingly  larger
increases  in inflation  to  cover  a given  increase  in the  operational  deficit.
This is  because  at higher  inflation  rates  the  elasticity  of money  demand
increases,  thus lowering  the  additional  marginal  revenue  that  a given  increase
in inflation  rat,  yields  as inflation  rises.
IV.  Macroeconomic  Stability,  External  Balance  and  Growth:  Can  They Be
Reconciled?
IV.1  A Quantitative  Framework
A  Purpose  and  structure  of the  Model
The  model  presented  here is designed  to shed  light  on the  key  questions
raised  in this  report:  can the  objectives  of external  balance  and satisfactory
output  growth  be reconciled?  What is the  role  of fiscal  policy  in this  trade
off?  Which  real  exchange  rate  path is compatible  with the  various  policy
scenarios  and growth  requirements?  What is the  relation  between  exchange  rates
and  external  balance?  The  model  is  used in an empirical  investigation  of the
trade  off  between  output  growth  and  external  balance,  and  the  role relative
prices  have to  play in this  trade  off.
Real interest  rates  play an important  role in the  model.  High real
interest  rates,  by depressing  private  investment  and  consumption,  create  more
room  for fiscal  deficits  for  any  given  external  balance  target.  At the  same
time,  high real interest  rates  complicate  fiscal  management,  since  they  raise
the  cost of servicing  the  domestic  part  of the  public  debt.  Crucial  parameters
are  the sensitivity  of  private  savings  and investment  with respect  to the  real
interest  rate;  these  receive  detail . attention  in the  empirical  section
below.
A second  channel  between  fiscal  policy,  output  growth  and external  debt
depends  not so  much on the  interrelation  between  aggregate  fiscal  deficits,
real interest  rates  and the  current  account,  but  more on the  composition  of
the  public  sector  expenditure  program.  A substantial  part  of aggregate
investment  in  Mexico  has traditionally  been undertaken  by the  public  sector.
As a consequence,  the  government's  allocation  of its  total  expenditure  over
consumption  and investment  is  an important  determinant  of output  growth  for
any  given  aggregate  expenditure  level  and  time  path  of the  real interest  rate.9
Another  important  relative  price  that is  endogenized  in the  model  is the
real exchange  rate.  The real  exchange  rate  plays  a role  in the  allocation  of
expenditure  over  different  goods  at a given  moment  of time,  similar  to the  way
the  real interest  rate  inflt,ences  the  intertemporal  expenditure  of expenditure
for  given  ii.  ra-temporal  allocation  (cf  van  Wijnbergen  (1989)  for  a detailed
exposition  of the theory  underlying  this  model).  This is  a rather  different
approach  from  most  other  empirical  models,  where the  real  exchange  rate,  if it
is endogenized  at all, is often  derived  from  current  account  considerations.
In our setup,  the  real exchange  rate  also influences  the  current  account,  but
in a rather  complicated  manner,  through  its  impact  on aggregate  supply  and
investment  behavior.  No empirical  evidence  could  be found  to support  the
Laursen-Metzler  notion  that  the  real  exchange  rate  also influences  consumption
expenditure.
It is in fac.  more  natural  to think  of the  real  exchange  rate  as the
relative  price  clearing  the  market  for "Mexican"  goods.  Its  equilibrium  value
is thus  not derived  from  current  account  considerations,  but from  commodity
market  clearing  conditions.  The level  of external  transfers,  the  composition
of government  expenditure  over  home and foreign  goods,  and  commercial  policy
all  have  an important  impact  on the  real  exchange  rate in this  approach.
Explicit  nominal  exchange  rate  policies  targeting  the  real  exchange  rate  may,
if successful,  cause  persistent  commodity  market  disequilibrium  (  van
Wijnbergen  (1989)).
In the  following  pages,  we provide  a simplified  exposition  of the
analytical  structure  of the  model.  We then  discuss  the  empirical  application
to  Mexican  data.
A.1  Real Interest  Rates,  Fiscal  Policy  and  Output  Growth.
As long  as domestic  interest  rates  are  not  completely  linked  to foreign
interest  rates (plus  exchange  rate  depreciation)  there  is  an additional  degree
of freedom  in  macroeconomic  policy.  Then changes  in  domestic  real interest
rates  can  resolve  potential  discrepancies  between  fiscal  deficits  and  externlal
ta'gets  through  their  impact  on the  net  private  savings  surplus  (i.e  private
saving  minus  private  investment).  In the  process,  private  investment  and  hence
output  growth  will  be affected. This is one  of the  more important  links
between  fiscal  policy  and output  growth  embedded  in  the  model.The  mechanism  is
shown  in Figure  1. Underlying  this  figure  is the  following  identity  derived
from  the  national  accounts,  but  with  behavioral  content  built into  private
savings  and investment:
CAS  - FS  +  NPS(r)
- FS +  PS(r)  - PI(r)
The private  sector's  surplus  of savings  over investment,  NPS-PS-PI,  is  shown
as a function  of the  real  rate  of interest.  A higher  real interest  rate  will
slow  down  private  sector  investment  and increase  private  savings,  thus
increasing  NPS. Empirical  evidence  on these  effects  is  presented  in Section
4.3.  This is  represented  by the  upward  sloping  line "NPS"  in Figure  4.1.
The sum  of NPS and  the fiscal  surplus  (FS;  this  equals  minus the
deficit)  equals  the  external  deficit  that  is compatible  with given  real
interest  rates  and  with FS.  The  external  deficit  is represented  by the line  CA
in Fig.  4.1.  The  horizontal  line  TCA  is the  target  value  for the  current10
account.  The  real interest  rate  at which the  current  account  target  TCA equals
the  current  account  CA is the  real  rate  at which  fiscal  policy  and  current
account  targets  are  in line.
An increase  in the  fiscal  deficit  represents  a decline  in the fiscal
surplus  and  hence  a downward  shift  in the  fea;ible  current  account  line  FCA.
To still  meet the  same  current  account  target,  a higher  interest  rate is
needed  to call forth  the  required  extra  surplus  of  private  savings  over
private  investment  (r  shifts  from  rA to rB).  A cut in fiscal  deficits  will
thus  allow lower  real  interest  rates  for  given  current  account  targets,  and
hence  higher  private  investment.
Fig.  4,1
The analysis  so far is  not enough  to tie  the  link  between  fiscal
deficits  and  output  growth.  It  has focused  on the  impact  of the  fiscal  deficit
on private  investment;  output  growth  depends  on total  investment,  however,  not
just on private  investment.  Clearly,  the impact  of changes  in fiscal  deficits
on output  growth  depends  on whether  the  underlying  adjustment  is  made out  of
public  investment  or out  of public  consumption.  The  model  therefore  breaks
down  public  expenditure  in public  consumption  and investment.  Output  growth
depends  on the  sum  of public  and  private  investment.
Of course,  interest  rate  arbitrage  between  domestic  and foreign  rates
may eliminate  any leeway  for  the  domestic  real interest  rate  to reconcile
fiscal  deficits  with current  account  targets.  In that  case,  another  degree  of
freedom  is lost.  For  any given  rate  of real  depreciation,  the  link  between
fiscal  deficits  and the  current  account  is direct  if real interest  rates  at
home and  abroad  cannot  diverge  more than  the  expected  real rate  of
depreciation.  The remarkably  close  link  between  the  fiscal  deficit  and the
current  account  in  Mexico (cf  Figure  4.3) suggest  that interest  arbitrage  is
in fact taking  place  in  Mexico;  the  no-arbitrage  version  of the  model,  with
real  rates  reconciling  fiscal  deficits  and external  balance ,  thus  seems  too
extreme.  We hence  have  used the  model  for  given  real  interest  rates,  rather
than  fixing  the  fiscal  deficit  and  having  the  real  interest  rate adjust
endogenously.  Of course  the  real  exchange  rate  is not  fixed  in the  real  world,
nor is its  rate  of change  exogenously  given.  Policy  measures  will  have a
direct  or indirect  impact  on both  level  and rate  of change  of the  real
exchange  rate.  To this  we turn  now.
A.2  Commodity  Market  Clearing  and the  Real  Exchange  Rate.
The  presentation  has  uncil  now focused  on the  current  account,  fiscal
deficits,  and the  real  rate  of interest.  But  what  about  the  real  exchange
rate?  Popular  discussions  of zhe  current  account  invariably  involve  the latter
variable.  This stems  from the  days where  the  current  account  was  analyzed
using  partial  equilibrium  trade  flow  equations,  with little  attention  tor the
underlying  macroeconomic  and intertemporal  aspects.  Within  modern  theory,  and
within  our  approach,  the  real  exchange  rate  of course  does  have an impact  on
the  current  account,  but in  a much  more ambiguous  and indirect  manner  than in
the  standard  open  economy  models  inherited  from the  fifties  and  sixties.The
approach  adhered  to  here starts  from the  simple  ohservation  that  the  real
exchange  rate  can  be viewed  as the  relative  price  of Mexican  (non-oil)  goods
(we  will omit the "non-oil"  qualification  in the  remainder  of this  section)  in11
terms  of foreign  goods.  The "market"  which the  real exchange  rate clears
(possibly  only  after  periods  of disequilibrium),  is the  market  for  Mexican
goods.  The real  exchange  rate is thus  a static  relative  price  in that it
measures  the  rate  at which  two  different  (aggregate)  commodities  can  be
exchanged  at a given  moment  of time.  The real  interest  rate  measures  the  rate
at which  commodities  can  be exchanged  at different  moments  of time,  through
savings  or investment  processes;  it thus  is an intertemporal  relative  price.
FIG  4.3  HERE
Consider  the  determinants  of aggregate  demand  and supply  in that  market.
Fig.  4.4  provides  a diagrammatical  elaboration  (see  Edwards  and  van  Wijnbergen
(1988)  for  a similar  approach  in a static  framework).  First  aggregate  demand
for  Mexican  goods.  One component  comes  from  Mexican  consumers  (and  investors).
At a  more appreciated  real  exchange  rate (de  < 0),  Mexicans  will tend  to
allocate  their  aggregate  expenditure  towards  foreign  goods  rather  than  towards
Mexican  goods.  Similarly,  an appreciated  real  exchange  rate  will, ceteris
paribus,  cause  lower  export  sales (  foreign  demand  falls  off).  This is
represented  by the  upward  sloping  curve  Ad in figure  4.4.
Aggregate  supply  of Mexican  goods  is likely  to increase  when the  real
exchange  rate  appreciates  (again,  de < 0),  if only  because  then intermediate
imports  will become  cheaper  in terms  of  mexican  goods (see  the  econometric
evidence  presented  below).  The aggregate  supply  curve  A. therefore  slopes  down
in Fig.  4.4 (note  that  e is  defined  as foreign  over  domestic  prices,  or the
inverse  of the  relative  price  of home goods).  The "equilibrium"  exchange  rate
is the  rate  at which  aggregate  supply  and  demand  for  Mexican  goods  are  in
equilibrium:  the intersection  of A.  and  Ad in fig.4.4.  Above  that
intersection,  there  is excess  demand  for  home goods  and  output  will be supply
determined:  the  exchange  rate is  under.alued  (excessively  depreciated).  Below
the  intersection,  supply  exceeds  demand  and  output  is  hence  demand  determined.
The real  exchange  rate is overvalued  and  there  is Keynesian  unemployment.
An increase  in government  expenditure  on home goods  would  shift  the  Ad
curve  down  and  so reduce  excess  supply  and  Keynesian  unemployment  problems
(dotted  line in  fig.  4.4).  As a consequence,  the  commodity  market  clearing,
"equilibrium"  real  exchange  rate  would  fall (de  > 0 from  E to F in Fig.  4.4).
FIG  4.4  HERE
A.3 The  Real  Exchange  Rate,  Interest  Rates  and  the  Current  Account.
What about  the  current  account?  First  note  that the  real  exchange  rate
that  equilibrates  aggregate  demand  for  Mexican  goods  with their  aggregate
supply,  can  do so at any level  of the  external  deficit.  An external  deficit
indicates  that  aggregate  expenditure,  by Mexicans  but on foreign  and  domestic
goods,  exceeds  aggregate  income.  It  provides  no indication  however,  that
aggregate  demand,  by Mexicans  and  by foreigners,  but  now on Mexican  goods
alone,  is in excess  of aggregate  suply  of Mexican  goods  at the  going  real
exchange  rate.
That does  not  mean that  the  real  exchange  rate  and the  current  account
are entirely  unrelated.  Figure  4.5 draws  on the  preceding  ones and
demonstrates  how the  current  account,  the  real  interest  rate and  the  real
exchange  rate interact.  Consider  first  commodity  market  equilibrium,  but now12
not in "e-A"  space,  but with the  real  exchange  rate  and interest  rate  on the
axes.  Assume  that  at E commodity  market  equilibrium  obtains.  If one then  moves
to the  left (the  exchange  rate  appreciates,  de<O),  excess  supply  develops.
This  was also  demonstrated  in fig.  4.4.  To  restore  equilibrium,  demand  need  to
be curtailed;  dne  way of doing  that  is raising  real  interest  rates;  that
lowers  demand  for all  consumption  and  investment  goods  (see  the  empirical
evidence  presented  below),  thus  also  for  domestic  goods.  The commodity  market
equilibrium  locus  thus  slopes  upward  in r-e  space.
Fig.  4.5  HERE
Consider  next the  combinations  of r and  e that  will allow  achievement  of
a particular  current  account  target,  say  CAS*,  for  given  fiscal  policy.  If at
E that target  is achieved,  moving  up (higher  r) will lead  to overachievement:
higher  real interest  rates  will,  ceteris  paribus,  reduce  private  consumption
and investment  and  thus lead  to a CA improvement.  Which  way  will the  exchange
rate  have to move to  bring  the  CA in line  with its  target?  As theory  suggests,
and the  empirical  analysis  presented  below  confirms,  the  answer  is sometimes
unclear.  Theory  suggests  that  for  cons,ant  rate  of time  prefeLance  the
exchange  rate  has no effect  on the  private  consumption  (  Razin  and Svensson
(1983)).  The empirical  analysis  presented  below  shows  that  this is in fact  the
case for  Mexico.  On the  other  hand,  investment  will  be affected  negatively,
mostly  because  of the  impact  on intermediate  import  prices  of a devaluation,
but this  effect  takes  place  with a one  year lag  only.  In the  short  run  the
only  effect  at play is the  negative  impact  of a real  depreciation  on aggregate
supply.  Thus in the  short  run  a real  devaluation  is in fact  likely  to
deteriorate  the  current  account.  However,  in the  longer  run  the  negative
impact  on investment  will reverse  this,  like  in the  standard  J-curve  effect,
although  through  a different  mechanism.  This  means  that to restore  the  CA to
its target  in the  short  run  a depreciation  is needed  (the  CA curve  slopes  also
upward,  like  the  GM curve;  see  fig.  4.5.B),  but in the longer  run  an
appreciation  will be necessary,  leading  to  a negative  slope  (fig.4.5A).  Since
this  analysis  has a medium  run  focus,  we still  concentrate  on the  case  where
the  slope  is  negative.
What does  this  analysis  suggest  will  happen  if,  say  because  of
"inertial"  inflation  and  a fixed  nominal  exchange  rate,  the real  exchange
becomes  overvalued?  This is represented  by the  move from  E to D in Fig.  4.5.A.
First  of all, there  will be excess  supply  of domestic  goods  and  hence  falling
exports,  declining  capacity  utilization,  and  Keynesian  unemployment.  What
happens  to the  current  account  depends  on whether  the  CA curve  slopes  up or
down;  if down,  it deteriorates  when  moving  from  E to  D and  if up it actually
improves.  If the  two  effects  wash  out,  nothing  will happen  to it.  In the
medium  run  however,  a deterioration  is  more likely  according  to the  empirical
analysis  presented  below.  If the  government  responds  to the  rising
unemployment  and falling  capacity  utilization  by raising  government  purchases
of domestic  goods  rather  than  devaluing,  the  GM curve  shifts  to the left  and
the  commodity  market  problem  is resolved.  However,  especially  if this  fiscal
expansion  is  not  matched  by increased  revenues,  the  CA will deteriorate  and
the  CA curve  shifts  up.  This  means  that  the  original  CA target  will
increasingly  get  out of reach.  Thus  an overvalued  exchange  rate  will lead  to
unemployment  and  possibly  to a deteriorating  CA as time  goes  by, or to  no
unemployment  but a real  CA problem  if fiscal  policy  is used to offset  the13
employment  effects  of the  overvalued  exchange  rate.  In this  case the
appropriate  policy  response  to falling  exports  and sluggish  capacity
utilization  is in fact  a real  depreciation,  to which  a nominal  depreciation
may contribute.
Of course,  like in the  preceding  subsection,  interest  rate arbitrage
takes  away one  degree  of freedom:  the  real interest  rate,  for  given  RATE  of
depreciation, confines the economy to the line at r*+Ae). It will also pin
down the  growth  rate,  for  given  any  public  investment  program;  this  can  be
seen in the  left quadrant  of diagram  4.5.
B  Empirical  Results
B.1  Aggregate  Supply  and  Aggregate  Demand
Consider  first  aggregate  expenditure.  Government  expenditure,  both cn
consumption  and  on capital  goods,  is  considered  a policy  instrument.
Consumption  expenditure  depends  on estimates  of permanent  and temporary
income,  and on the  after  tax  real  race  of interest.  The  measure  of permanent
income  is  based  on a simple  trend  regression  of real  disposable  income  on
time,  with a trend  break  from  1984  onwards  (i.e.  the  decline  in  1983 is
interpreted  as a surprise).  The  results  of this  regression  are:
(1)  log(yDR,t)  - 2.19  +  (0.063  - D83PLUS*0.017)*t
(64.9)  (21.3)  (7.21)
R2-0.96  DW-1.58  1965-1987
Inflationary  expectations  are  derived  from  a four  year weighted  average
of actual  CPI inflation  rates.  The  predicted  value  of this  weighting  procedure
is used in the  calculation  of real after  tax interest  rates.  The  nominal  rate
used is the  nominal  after  tax time  deposit  rate  series  presented  in Gil-Diaz
(1988)  for 1965-1986,  and  the  three  month  after  tax  time  deposit  rate  for
1987.  With these  definitions  of temporary  and  permanent  income  and  of the  real
interest  rate,  the  econometric  results  for  private  consumption  are:
(2)  log(CGp,t)  - 5.18 - 0.44 log(l+rrTD,t)  +  0. 70*log(YDR,T)
(25.6)  (1.83)  (4.41)
+  O. 
8 6 *log(YDRT)))
(12.2)
R2-0.97,  DW-1.14,  1970-1987
The results  are  promising;  a coefficient  with respect  to permanent
income  that is  highly  significant,  but  not significantly  different  from  one;  a
coefficient  on temporary.income  that  is significantly  lower  than the
coefficient  on permanent  income;  and, finally,  a significant  (  at the  10
percent  level)  and  negative  coefficient  on the  real  after  tax  deposit  rate.
However,  the  low  value  of the  DW coefficient  indicates  some remaining
specification  error.  The regression  results  deteriorated  significantly  when
the  real  exchange  rate  was included;  that  variable  never  received  significant14
coefficients  and  was thus  omitted.  This finding  has important  consequernces  for
the  assessment  of the impact  of a real  devaluation  on the  current  account.
The second  interest  sensitive  component  of aggregate  expenditure  is
private  investment  (fixed  capital  formation).  Private  investment  depends  on
real interest  rates,  the  relative  price  of intermediate  inputs  and  the  output
capital  ratio  as a proxy  of capacity  utiliation,  for  which  no data  are
available  before  1980.  The real interest  rate  used is  based  on the  pre-tax
nominal  interest  rate reported  in  Gil-Diaz  (1988);  this  rate is converted  into
a real rate  using  a VAR  of GNP deflator  inflation  on its  own  past  values  going
back three  years,  plus  a constart  term.  The predicted  values  of this  equation
are  used as proxy  for inflationary  expectations;  this  proxy,  in turn,  is  used
to derive  the  real interest  rate,  rrGNP.  The measure  of intermediate  imports
prices  is the  dollar-based  unit-value  of intermediate  imports  deflated  by the
dollar-based  Mexican  GNP deflator.  This  yields  the  following  results:
(3)  log(Ip,t)  - 0.75  - 0. 60*log(l+rrGNp(.l))  -0.26*log(l+rrrCNP(-2))
(0.80)  (2.64)  (1.05)
+  1.59*log(yt/Kt)  - 0.30*log(Pmi,t(-,))*E(-1)/PGNP(  1))
(7.18)  (2.12)
R2-0.95,  DW-1.23,  1970-1987
The results  show a strong  negative  dependence  of private  fixed  capital
formation  on real interest  rates  and  on the  relative  price  of intermediate
imports  in terms  of final  goods.  Both enter  with a lag,  as should  be expected;
Ipr  is  actual  investment  expenditure,  not  orders.
Private  investment  and  consumption  expenditure  plus total  government
expenditure  and inventory  accumulation  (considered  exogenous  in the  current
version  of the  model)  make up aggregate  expenditure.
Aggregate  supply  of non-oil  Mexican  goods  depends  on the  beginning  of
period  capital  stock,  on the  relative  price  of intermediate  imports  and  on the
relative  final  price  of Mexican  goods  in terms  of an index  of foreign
competitors  prices  abroad.  The latter  is  measured  as an aggregate  of the
dollar-based  WPI in  Mexico's  main trading  partners,  with 1980  export  weights.
(4)  log(yt/Kt)  - - 2.02  +  0. 39*log(PGNP/Pf)  +  0.18*log(PrNp(.l)/Pf( 1 ))
(2.15)  (5.51)  (2.95)
- 0.13*PDL(10g(pmint(-l)/PGNP(  1))
(1.64)
R2-0.96,  DW-1.38,  1974-1987
The equation  shows  a strong  positive  response  to the (inverse  of the)  real
exchange  rate:  a real appreciation  increases  aggregate  supply.  Also,  an
increase  in the  relative  price  of intermediate  imports  or a decrease  in the
capital  stock  both lower  aggregate  supply.
Aggregate  employment,  Nt,  depends  on the  real  product  wage and  on
aggregate  non-oil  output:




R2-0.67,  DW-1.74,  1966-1987
A small  negative  real  wage elasticity,  significant  at a ten  percent  level,  and
an income  elasticity  substantially  below  one.
Next year's  capital  stock  depends  on this  year's  and  on total  fixed
capital  formation:
(6)  Kt+ 1 - (1-0.04)*Kt  + (Iprt+IG.t)
The assumption  of a four  percent  depreciation  rate is  based  on SPP  data  with
some  correction  for the  likely  understatement  of true  depreciation  in the
national  accounts  in inflationary  periods  due  to historical  cost  accounting
practices.
The intertemporal  part of the  model  is rounded  out  by the  current
account  identity:
(7)  CA  yt  +  Xojl*Poj2.,S*E/PGNP  - i*Bf,SE/PNP  - Cpr,t  - ipr,t  - . t
B.2  Allocation  of Expenditure  and the  Real Exchange  Rate
The  part of the  model  presented  in the  previous  section  focused  mostly
on intertemporal  trade.  It thus  dealt  with the  allocation  of current
production  and  expenditure  over the  present  and future  periods,  rather  than
over domestic  and  foreign  goods.  In line  with that  focus,  the  most important
relative  price  variable  was the  real interest  rate.  In this section,  the focus
is intratemporal  trade,  allocation  of expenditure  over  current  Mexican  versus
current  future  goods,  and the  relevant  relative  price  variable  is the  real
exchange  rate.
Consider  first  the  allocation  of domestic  expenditure  over foreign  and
domestic  goods.  We do this  by explicitly  estimating  import  demand  equations
for the  different  import  categories.  The  volume  of capital  goods  imported,
ecap,  depends  on the  relative  price  of capital  goods  imports  versus  investment
goods  in general  (  the  GNP deflator  for  investment)  and on aggregate
investment:
(7)  log(Mcap) 
14.11  - l.l2*log(P.caP  SE/PINV)  - 0.74*1og(Pc.p,$(  1)E(  1)/PINV(  ))
(5.93)  (5.63)  (2.72)
+  0.7l*log(Ipr+Ig)  - 0.88*MQUSH(-l)
(5.77)  (4.52)
R2 _0O.94,  DW-1.40,  1970-1987
The  variable  MQUSH  is the fraction  of imports  covered  by QRs; it is
included  in an admittedly  crude  attempt  to  capture  to many  changes  in trade
regime  that  have taken  place  in  Mexico  over the  sample  period.  The results16
show relatively  high elasticities,  all  estimated  with great  precision  (  high
t-statistics).  The trade  regime  variable  seems  to pick  up the  degree  of
repressiveness  of the  trade  regime:  it  enters  with a strong  negative  sign.
Consider  next consumption  goods  imports,  Mcon:
(8)  log(Mcon)  -
2.34  - 2.12*1og(Pmco 0 8 E/Pcp 1) - 1.23*1og(P.,on,$(-I)E(  1)/PCPI(  1))
(0.94)  (4.85)  (2.7)
+  1.31*1og(Cpr)  - 0.96*MQUSH(-l)
(4.15)  (2.54)
R2-0.82,  DW-1.54,  1970-1987
Once again  high and  significant  price  elasticities  and  a strong  negative
impact  of the  proxy  for  trade  intervention.  Finally  demand  for intermediate
imports,  Mint:
(9)  log(Mint)  - - 18.7 - 0. 64*log(Pmint,$E/PGNp)  +  2.84*log(y)
(2.20)  (5.29)  (10.2)
- 0.96*MQUSH(-l)
(1.34)
R2-0.91,  DW-1.40,  1970-1987
This equation  shows  a somewhat  lower,  although  highly  significant  price
elasticity,  and an unusually  high income  elasticity.
One can deduce  total  demand  for  Mexican  goods  by domestic  residents  in
any given  period  by combining  the import  demand  equations  with the  equations
for  aggregate  domestic  expenditure,  and  scaling  by the  relevant  relative
prices.  To complete  the  analysis  of commodity  market  equilibrium  in the  market
for (non-oil)  Mexican  goods,  an additional  element  is needed,  however:  foreign
demand  for  Mexican  goods  or export  demand.
In the  specification  of the  export  demand  equation,  we assumed  that
Mexican  exporters  compete  not  so much  with domestic  producers  ir  Mexico's
export  markets,  but  with other  exporters  to the  same  markets.  This is a
reasonable  assumption,  given  that  Mexico's  two  main  export  markets  are  the  US
and  the EEC.  Empirical  analysis  for  other  developing  countries  tends  to
confirm  this  view (  cf  Kharas  (1988),  van  Wijnbergen  and  Arslan  (1989)).  This
means  that  the  relevant  activity  variable  is  aggregate  imports  into  Mexico's
export  markets  (weighted  by their  share  in  Mexico's  total  exports),  and the
relevant  relative  price  variable  is the  ratio  of  Mexico's  export  price  over
the  aggregate  price  index  of imports  into  Mexico's  export  markets.  This
yields:
(10)  log(XDnoi-/XDnoi1(-1))  - 1.55 - 0.95*log(RPXPF/RPXPF(-l))
(0.96)  (2.79)
- 0.l2*1og(RPXPF(-l)/RPXPF(-2))  +  1.50*1og(MF/MF(-l))
(3.40)  (3.38)17
R2-0.59,  DW-2.56,  1968-1987
where  RPXPF-(Px,s/Pm),  the  dollar  price  of Mexican  non-oil  exports  over the
aggregate  dollar-based  price  index  of imports  into  Mexico's  export  markets.  MF
is the  volume  of imports  into  those  markets  (again,  weig,,ted  by each country's
share  in  Mexico's  total  non-oil  exports).  Analysis  of the  error  structure
suggested  estimationi  in terms  of rates  of change  rather  than  of (log)  levels.
The  equation  performs  reasonably  well:  significant  price  elasticties  and a
high,  significant  "income"  elasticity.  However  it  would  probably  be useful  to
distinguish  different  export  markets.
The model  is completed  by a commodity  market  clearing  equation  for
current  Mexican  non-oil  goods:
(11)  Yt - Cpr,d  +  Ipr,d  + 
0 d  +  XDnoil
In this  set-up,  the  relative  price  of exports  in terms  of aggregate  home
goods,  RPXPF-(Px.s/PF),  is considered  exogenous.  This is relaxed  in the  next
section.
B.3  An Extension:  Export  Supply  Considered  Explicitly
In the  analysis  presented  sofar,  no explicit  distinction  was made
between  supply  of home goods  for  domestic  versus  for  foreign  markets.  Hence
there  is only one  domestic  output  price.  In practice  however,  it is more than
likely  that such  an explicit  supply  does  exist,  either  because  of product
differentiation  or  because  of non-competitive  market  structure  and  different
degrees  of competition  in home  and foreign  markets.  A shorthand  way of
capturing  this  would  be to  endogenise  the  relative  price  of exports  versus
goods  sold  at home and  estimate  an explicit  export  supply  function,  according
to  which  firms  choose  to sell  at home or abroad  depending  on that  relative
price.  Commodity  market  equilibrium  would then  involve  two  separate  equations,
one for  goods  sold  at  home and  one for  goods  sold  abroad.
(12) log(XSn.i 0 /y0) - log(XSnoi 1(-l)/yt(-l))  -
0.12  +  0.12*log(RPXY/RPXY(-l))  +  0.51*log(RPXY(-l)/RPXY(-2))
(0.41)  (0.63)  (2.76)
R2 -0.31,  DW-1.97,  1966-1987
with RPXY-Px,sE/PGNp.  The  R2 is  low,  as is to  be expected  for  an equation
estimated  in rates  of change;  but supply  elasticity  with respect  to price  is
significant  and of the "right"  sign.  In this  set-up,  equation  (11)  is replaced
by commodity  market  clearing  for  goods  sold  at home  and for  goods  sold  abroad:
(lla)  yt  - XSnoi.  - Cpr.d  +  Ipr,d +  Gd
(llb)  XSnoil  - XDnoil
The extra  relative  price  variable  is  RPXY.18
IV.2  The  Framework  Applied:  Mexico's  Outlook  for  Growth
A  Private  Savings,  Investment  and the  Current  Account:  Is  There  Room for
Growth?
The  base case starts  from  an assumption  of moderate  (2  percent  of GDP)
current  account  deficits  over  the  next two  years.  It  constitutes  less  than
half of the interest  due and  would,  at projected  world inflation  rates,  result
i-.  a fall  in the real  value of the  debt.  From  1992  onwards,  we presume  slight
widening  of tae CA deficit  to three  percent  of GDP.  This is roughly  compatible
with a constant  real  value of the  external  debt and  a falling  debt-output
ratio,  as  by that time  growth  will  be gathering  steam.
Given  projected  private  savings  and investment  developments,  what does
this target  imply  for  fiscal  deficits?  The  model  runs  suggest  that  the  non-
interest  budget  surplus  will need to average  around  seven  percent  for  most of
the  period,  down from  7.6  percent  in 1986.  This is  below  the  consistency
requirements  derived  in Section  III  in the  first  two  years  when real interest
rates  are likely  to stay  high.  But it is above  what is  necessary  towards  the
end  of the  sexennio  when real  rates,  if all  goes  well,  should  drop to a more
reasonable  risk  premium  over foreign  real  rates.  Real rates  are  assumed  to
stay  at 30  percent  in 1989,  to fall to 20  percent  in  1991 and  10 % from  92
onwards.  The operational  surplus  will thus  recover  from its  likely  three
percentage  deficit  in 1988  and  a projected  deterioration  in 1989 to
approximate  balance  by the  end of the  sexennio.
Private  consumption  is  projected  to slow  down  as a share  of GDP somewhat
next  year,  and recover  the lost  ground  later  in the  sexennio.  As to public
investment,  it is assumed  to slightly  fall in 1989  due to budgetary  restraint,
but gradually  recover  thereafter.  This  yields  public  investment  of 5 percent
of GDP in 1990,  climbing  to 6.5  percent  at the  end  of the  sexennio.  What
happens  to total  investment  and thus  output  growth  depends  on private
investment  behavior.  This in turn  depends  on real  interest  rates  and  the tax
policy  followed.  Without  any tax  credit,  investment  is  projected  to slow  down
under  the impact  of continuing  high real interest  rates,  down  by almost  two
percenuage  points  of GDP in 1990  compared  to 1988.  As a consequence,  total
investment  would then  fall  by a percentage  point  of GDP in 1989,  but gradually
recovers  thereafter  to reach  18.5  percent  of GDP  towards  the  end  of the
sexennio  (Fig.  5B).  This is up from  15.4  percent  in 1988.
This investment  behavior  will lead  to a resumption  of growth,  but in a
rather  unspectacular  manner  (Fig.  5A).  After  a projected  growth  of 1.5  percent
in 1989,  output  growth  slowly  climbs  from  2 percent  in 1990  to 3.7  in 1993  and
3.9  percent  in 1994.  Private  investment,  after  dropping  initially,  will  by
then  have recovered  its  1988  value  of around  12 percent  of GDP under  the
influence  of lower  real interest  rates.  This  implies  that the  main impetus
will in fact  come from  government  investment,  which  goes  up by between  two  and
three  percent  of GDP  over the  Sexenio.
An investment  tax  credit  along  the  lines  of the  one that  is in fact  on
the  books  since  1988  will  have a significant  impact.  The analysis  suggests
that  will especially  be true in the  early  years  where  real  interest  rate's  are
high (  the  scheme  has been  constructed  so as to  give  bigger  credits  the  higher
the  real interest  rate is).  Private  investment,  rather  than  dropping  by a full
percentage  point in each  of the  first  two  years  of the  sexennio  now  hardly19
falls  at all in 1989 (down  to 11.9%  from  12.1  percenL  of GDP in 1988).  After
that  a strong  recovery  follows  as the  tax  credit  reaches  its  full impact.
Private  investment  reaches  a peak  of 14.1  percent  of GDP in 1992  after  which
it tapers  off slightly  as the  declining  value  of the  tax  credit  more than
offsets  the impact  of falling  real interest  rates.  The  end result  is still  a
respectable  13.5  percent  of GDP  by 1994.
Since  public  investment  is not  affected  by the  tax  credit,  total
investment  will increase  in line  with private  investment,  to reach  around
twenty  percent  in the last  three  years  of the  Sexenio.  As a consequence,  real
growth  accelerates;  it  reaches  four  percent  two  years  earlier  because  of the
tax  credit,  in 1992  rather  than in 1994.  In the  last two  years  of the Sexenio,
the  economy  is projected  to grow  at a healthy  4.7  percent  a  year under  this
scenario.
Stronger  investment  performance  under  the  same  current  account  target  of
course  requires  higher  private  and/or  public  sector  savings  if the  same
current  account  performance  is to  be maintained.  The econometric  model runs
suggest  that  under this  high growth  scenario,  private  consumption  will grow
faster,  but less  so than  GDP.  As a consequence,  private  savings  goes  up to
provide  between  half and  one  percentage  point  of GDP  extra  leeway  towards  the
end  of the  sexennio.  The  remaining  difference  will need  to be made up by
fiscal  improvement.  An initial  improvement  of between  1 and 1.5  percent  of GDP
in the  non-interest  surplus  is necessary  to  accommodate  the  increased
investment  by the  private  sector.  Reforms  in tax  administration  and the
structure  of personal  income  and  property  taxation  take  on an added  importance
in this  context.  International  personal  income  tax  comparisons  suggest  that
such  an improvement  in public  sector  revenue  is  not infeasible.
What about  debt and the  exchange  rate  under  all these  scenarios?  Net
external  debt  decreases  under  both scenarios  as a percentage  of GDP,  but
faster  under the  high growth  scenario.  Without  the investment  tax  credit,  net
external  debt  falls  from  67 percent  of GDP in 1988 to 56  percent  at the  end of
the  Sexenio.  Under the  high growth  scenario  it actually  goes down  to 54
percent  of GNP  by 1994.
The  model  was run  assuming  a constant  real  exchange  rate  throughout  both
periods.  This  means that  there  is  a potential  imbalance  between  aggregate
demand  and supply  for  Mexican  (non-oil.)  goods;  the  ratio  of total  demand  for
(non-oil)  Mexican  goods  by foreigners  (export  demand)  and  by domestic
residents  over  aggregate  supply  of  Mexican  goods  can thus  be interpreted  as an
indicator  of exchange  rate  misalignment.  A decline  below  one  suggests  exchange
rate  overvaluation  (Fig.  6B).  The  model  run  suggests  that  exchange  rates  may
in fact  be a  problem  early  in  the  Sexenio.  The ratio  is  projected  to  drop from
89%  in 1988  to 86% in 1989.  After  that the  situation  improves  as increasing
investment  increases  demand  for  domestic  goods.  Under  the  no-tax-credit
scenario,  the  ratio  improves  rapidly  after  1989  and actually  reaches  one  by
1993.  This  suggests  that  growth  in 1989  could  actually  be restricted  because
of low  aggregate  demand  for  Mexican  goods  at the  current  relative  price (i.e.
real exchange  rate).  A real  devaluation  would  help avoiding  this  by shifting
domestic  and  foreign  expenditure  towards  Mexican  goods;  an issue  is,  however,
whether  under  the Pacto  a real  devaluation  can  in fact  be achieved.
A final  comment  on employment.  The real  wage was  assumed  to rise at  4
percent  per annum,  which,  according  to the  econometric  analysis,  just  offsets
the  autonomous  increase  in demand  for labor  for  given  GDP.  However,  with  an
estimated  labor  demand  elasticity  with respect  to  GDP of only 0.64,  employment20
growth  is only 0.7  percent  for the  first  two  years,  and then  climbs  up
gradually  to reach  two  percent  at the  end  of the  sexennio.  It is  not clear
that  with this  growth  and  real  wage outcomes,  the  projected  increase  in the
labor  force  can  be absorbed  into  productive  employment.
B  External  Financing,  Output  Growth  and the  Public  Sector
The scenario  has sofar  assumed  that  the  foreign  financing  necessary  to
cover  a current  account  deficit  of between  2 and three  percent  of GDP will
indeed  be forthcoming.  This  will require  additional  financing,  since  Mexico
has just entered  a period  of substantially  increased  repayment  obligations.
The implicit  assumption  is that  these  can  be refinanced,  and that  additional
funds  will be available  to allow  a current  account  deficit  of two  percent  of
GDP initially  and of three  percent  later  on.  Alternatively,  the  necessary  room
could  be provided  through  debt relief,  in  which  case the  necessary  decline  in
the  non-interest  current  account  can  be reached  without  a deterioration  in the
current  account,  and correspondingly  less  need for  new money.  Of course,  in
the  current  external  environment  it is  conceivable  that  aditional  funds  cannot
be raised.
In this  Section  we consider  two  alternatives  to the  base run.  Under  the
first  one,  Mexico  will  be allowed  to run  the  same  current  account  deficit  as
before,  but  with a major  debt rf-du^tion  operation  early  1989  halfing  the  value
of the  outstanding  commercially  held  debt.  This implies  a debt reduction  of
about  20%  of 1988  GDP.  The second  alternative  outlines  what is likely  to
happen  when  no debt  reduction  takes  place  and  no new  money  comes  in other  than
rolled  over  principal.  In this  case  Mexico  has to run  a zero  current  account
deficit.  We assume  that the  government  attempts  to  maintain  its  stabilization
effort;  but in that  case it is  highly  unlikely  that  domestic  interest  rates
will come  down.  Under this  zero  CA run, therefore,  domestic  real interest
rates  stay at their  current  30%  level.
Consider  first  the  case  where  no new  money  will  be forthcoming,  and  no
debt relief  takes  place.  Mexico  simply  runs  a zero  current  account  balance,
fully  paying  interest  but rolling  over  principal.  The  macroeconomic
consequences  will clearly  depend  on how the  internal  adjustment  to this
external  shock  will take  place.  Does the  fiscal  sector  adjust  one  for one?  and
if so, through  cuts in  government  consumption  or cuts in  public  sector
investment?  By assumption,  the  government  cuts  back public  investment  in line
with the  decline  of "allowable"  external  net  borrowing.  On top  of that  comes
reduced  private  investment  because  of higher  real interest  rates.
The external  shock  amounts  to two  percent  of  GDP initially,  and three
percent  from 1993  onwards.  Public  investment  falls  to an absurdly  low  0.9
percent  of GDP in initially,  and  never  regains  the  three  percent  level  assumed
fot 1989 in the  base case.  It  hovers  around  2.7  percent  of Gr.P  for  the  rest  of
the  sexennio.
This clearly  has a major  impact  on growth  (Fig.  6A,  line "YGROCAOhr").
Output  growth  slows  down  by one  percentage  point  initially;  as time  goes  by
the  fall in growth  deepens  to more than  two  percent  by the  end  of the  sexennio
as private  and  public  investment  decline.  On average  over the  next six  years,
growth  declines  by almost  2 percent  of GDP, to reach  only two  percent  at the
end  of the  sexennio  and less  than  that  before.  The slowdown  in growth  has a
perverse  multiplier  effect  on the  need for  public  sectore  adjustment.  Slower
growth  leads  to a fall in  private  sector  savings,  which  requires  a larger21
fiscal  adjustment  than  would  otherwise  he e  been necessary.  On the  other  hand
reduced  private  investment  (because  of h gher  domestic  real  interest  rates)
creates  more room  for  public  sector  deficits  given  the  CA constraint.
Figures  6A-B  here
Not  surprizingly  employment  grows  slows  down too  and  never  exceeds  one
percent  in  any  year of the  sexennio.  Finally  the  exchange  rate  misalignment
indicator  drops  too,  and in fact  never  comes  close  to 1 (Fig.  6B)  Under this
scenario,  exchange  rate  misalignment  would  be a continuing  problem.  The
conclusion  is that  without  access  to external  funds  a real  devaluation  becomes
unavoidable.  This is  of course  the  main  channel  through  which  uncertainty  on
the  external  debt  situation  influences  domestic  real interest  rates.
The  debt relief  scenario  paints  a substantially  rosier  picture.  Fig.  6A
showes  that  with a 2% CA deficit  increasing  to 3% in  1992  AND a fifty  percent
reduction  in commercially  held debt,  output  growth  is likely  to come  earlier
and  go further  than in the  base case.  Also,  the  exchange  rate  mise;  g'ment
problem,  while  still  there  in 1989,  would  disappear  towards  the  sc.coni  half of
the  Sexenio.
The  message  of this  section  is  clear:  unless  debt  relief  or long  term
new  money is  provided  on a scale  allowing  recovery  of private  investment,
growth,  both  of output  and  employment,  is  not  possible.  Renewed  output  growth
is incompatible  with full service  of the  existing  debt.
C  External  Shocks:  Oil  Prices  and  World  Interest  Rates
A simple-rule  of thumb  already  indicates  Mexico's  sensitivity  to changes
in  world  interest  rates  and  oil  prices.  One dollar  less  per  barrel  of oil
costs  Mexico  approximately $0.5  bUS,  and  one  percentage  point  in the  world
interest  rate  adds $1  bUS to the  burden  of its  external  debt.  Thus the  recent
rise in  world  interest  rates  (over  two  percentage  points  since  March last
year)  costs  Mexico  roughly  a  percentage  pcint  of  GDP, or half of the "low
case"  scenario  explored  in the  last  Secti.n.
However,  in particular  interest  ratt's  have an impact  that  goes  beyond
their  income  effect.  Interest  arbitrage  is  almost  certainly  to lead  to  higher
interest  rates  in  Mexico  if  world  interest  rates  rise.  One  would thus  expect  a
further  negative  impact  on output  growth  tirough  a decline  in private
investment.  Fig. 7 shows  the  net  effects.
Fig.  7 Here
The recent  rise  in interest  rates,  once its impact  on publ.-  and  private
investment  is fully  incorporated,  leads  to  a fall  in the  growth  r4te  of almost
one  percentage  point  towards  the  end  of the  Sexenio.  This underscores  the
extent  to  which  Mexico's  problems  are  by now  mostly  foreign  made.  According  to
some  estimates,  a $150  bUS cut  in US deficits  (the  Gramm-Rudman  target)  would
lower  real interest  rates  by three  percentage  points  (van  Wijnbergen  (1985)).
The  US fiscal  deficit  can thus  be blamed  for  a 1.5  percentage  point  drop in
Mexico's  growth  rate in  each  year it is in effect.
V.  Conclusions22
Without  renewed  access  to foreign  capital  markets,  Mexico  faces  a grim
fiscal  situation.  Without  a  net nominal  increase  in foreign  debt,  a 15  percent
inflation  target  requires  no less  than  a three  percent  increase  in the  non-
interest  surplus  for fiscal  consistency.  This is  up from  the  already
extraordinarily  high 7.6  percent  primary  surplus  in 1988.  To put this in
perspective,  this  would  amount  to  a wholesale  scrapping  of the  entire  public
sector  investment  program.  In fact,  the  fiscal  effort  should  be even larger
than  that;  at unchanged  policies  the  operational  deficit  is likely  to  worsen
in 1989  unless  there  is a substantial  turn-around  in the international  price
of oil.  Measures  to offset  this  increase  would  come in  addition  to the  three
percent.
An adjustment  this  large  would  clearly  be a  very difficult  task  after
the  massive  fiscal  retrenchment  of the  past few  years.  Issue  of indexed
domestic  debt could  alleviate  the  fiscal  problem  caused  by high domestic  real
interest  rates;  but another  conclusion  seems  inevitable.  As long  as internal
internal  rates  remain  as  high as they  are,  Mexico's  fiscal  problems  are
intractable  without  renewed  access  to foreign  capital  markets.  But the
analysis  suggests  that  rollover  of half or two  thirds  of foreign  interest
payments,  in addition  to principal  payments,  would  bring  a solution  within
reach.  But the  paper  also demonstrates  that  service  of the  face  value  of the
current  debt  without  substantial  amounts  of new  money  is incompatible  with
renewed  output  growth  and  thus  not really  in  anybodv's  interest.
An important  issue  is the  macroeconomic  impact  of the  particular
approach  taken  to debt relief.  The  paper  demonstrated  that  public  debt for
private  equity  swaps  would  raise  the  equilibrium  inflation  rate substantially
if implemented  on a scale  that is interesting  from  a macroeconomic  point  of
view.
But  without  access  to foreign  capital  markets  in one  form  or another,
output  growth  would  be compromised,  as the  simulations  have shown.  Moreover,
with low  growth,  the  funding  policies  of the  public  sector  will be complicated
immensely.  Also,  with low  growth  and  a high resource  transfer  to foreigners,
the real  exchange  rate  would  need to  be devalued  much further  than  would  be
necessary  with a smaller  resource  transfer  out of  Mexico.  Low growth  because
of insufficient  access  to foreign  capital  markets  would  thus  also  jeopardise
the short  term stability  sought  under  the  Pacto.  Renew3d  access  to foreign
capital  markets  is thus  not only imperative  for  restoration  of medium  term
growth,  but also  essential  for the  chances  of success  of the  current  short
term  stabilization  effort.
The increase  in  external  debt implied  by renewed  access  to international
capital  markets  does  not really  threaten  Mexico's  creditworthiness.  Even  a
three  percent  of GDP (appr.  5  bUS$)  current  account  deficit  per anr.um,  with a
corresponding  increase  in  external  debt,  would  simply  keep the  external  debt
constant  in real terms.  Thus the  debt-output  ratio  would in fact  decline  even
at  moderate  rates  of growth.  On the  other  hand,  a  cut-off  from  external
capital  markets,  with the  attendant  short  term stabilization  problems  and
likely  medium  term  slow  down in  output  growth,  would  compromise  Mexico's
ability  to service  even its  current  debt.  Thus,  paradoxically,  lending  to
Mexico  would  very likely  increase  the  expected  net  repayment,  in  discounted
value  terms,  rather  than  decrease  it,  the  increased  up front  borrowing
initially  notwithstanding.
All this depends  crucially  on developments  in  world  commodity  and
capital  markets.  The income  effects  of a percentage  point  increase  in the23
world interest  rate is roughly  equal  to the  income  effect  of a $2 US decrease
in the  price  of oil. Both  cause  Mexico  to lose  almost  a billion  US dollar  a
year.  But  higher  world  real interest  rates  are likely  to cause  at least
equivalent  increases  in real interest  rates  at home,  and  possibly  more if they
lead to  expectations  of expected  depreciation.  They thus  have a stronger
impact  on economic  growth  than  oil  price  changes  with equivalent  income
effects.  As an example,  the  paper  demonstrated  that  the  effect  of 2  percentage
points  increase  in  world  interest  rates  between  March  1988  and  March  1989
slowed  down  Mexico's  growth  by an estimated  one  percentage  point.  The lesson
seems  to  be that any  external  debt arrangement  better  includes  contingency
clauses  conditional  on oil  price  and  foreign  interest  rate  developments.
Otherwise  it  might  be difficult  to  maintain  a stable  growth  performance  in the
middle  of the  vagaries  of international  developments.
With foreign  financing  in  place,  and  the internal.reform  program
continued  and  deepened  beyond  the  considerable  progress  already  made,  a
cautiously  optimistic  prognosis  seems  justified.  The analysis  presented
suggests  that  with all  this in  place,  a recovery  of growth  is likely  to start
by the  end  of 1989,  with positive  per capita  growth  to  be expected  thereafter.
Moreover,  while  this  would  require  additional  funding  from  abroad,  Mexico's
debt indicators  are  projected  to  decline  substantially  nevertheless.  With a
continuation  of the  Government's  reform  program,  investing  in Mexico  promises
a  high pay-off.
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